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NOTES
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATE

STRIKEBREAKING LAWS AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
The preemption doctrine, as applied to the national labor relations laws
and, more generally, to national labor policy, has been a much litigated
area.' The doctrine, based on the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution, provides that, where a conflict exists, state law must yield to
the exercise of congressional authority.2 Congress has exerted its authority
over labor relations in three major statutes: the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 (NLRA); 3 the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(LMRA),4 which amended and incorporated the NLRA;5 and Title VII of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA).6 The enactment of these comprehensive federal labor-management relations laws indicates the recognition by Congress that the free
flow of commerce requires a centralized regulatory scheme to ensure in1. See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972).
2. The supremacy clause, found in U.S. CONST., art. VI, provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of conflicting federal and state regulation in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), holding that federal legislation will prevail
over state law when Congress has properly exercised its powers under the Constitution. The
preemption doctrine has been advanced primarily through the exercise of commerce clause
powers. See Engdahl, Preemptive Capabilityof FederalPower, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 5253 (1973).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976) (Wagner Act).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171, 187 (1976) (Taft-Hartley Act).
5. For the purposes of this article, references to the National Labor Relations Act of
1935, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, will be cited as the
LMRA or the "Act." References to the National Labor Relations Act alone will be cited as
the NLRA.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 153, 158-160, 164, 187 (1976) (Landrum-Griffith Act). Although
this act amends sections of the LMRA, its primary purpose is the regulation of internal
union affairs rather than union-management relations generally covered by the LMRDA.
Section 164 of the LMRDA eliminates most preemption questions by providing that, except
for a few expressly stated exceptions, state laws enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 30:521

dustrial peace.7 Moreover, the creation of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), 8 charged with enforcing the LMRA, is further recognition
that a successful federal labor-management relations policy requires uniform interpretation and application of the labor laws. 9 Accordingly, state
law and state court jurisdiction in this field must often give way to federal
exclusivity. io
The Supreme Court has decided labor preemption questions in such
areas as state regulation of union picketing," state tort claims," 2 and unemployment insurance for striking employees.' 3 The Court has attempted
to establish rules applicable to classes of cases rather than reviewing each
case on an adhoc basis.' 4 The application of the preemption doctrine with
its many exceptions, however, is rarely a simple task. As a result, there are
areas in union-management affairs where states must act at their peril because their authority to legislate may be susceptible to attack.' 5 One such
area is state regulation of efforts by employers to replace striking employees.
Strikebreaking laws' 6 have been enacted, in one form or another, in
thirty states."' Through these statutes, states have regulated employers
and third parties who solicit and hire workers to replace strikers lawfully
on strike. Few courts have grappled with the question of whether these
statutes are subject to federal preemption. Those courts that have addressed the issue, however, have not looked favorably on this exercise of
7. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 190-91 (1978). See also 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976) (Findings and Policies).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976).
9. See note 7 supra.
10. See Cox, supra note 1, at 1338-39.
il. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (states preempted in restraining peaceful union picketing).
12. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (states not preempted
in granting damages for libelous statements made by a union agent during an organizing
campaign); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (states
not preempted in granting damages for loss of business due to union threats of violence).
13. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979)
(states not preempted in paying unemployment benefits to striking employees).
14. Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 296 n.7 (1977); Lodge 76, IAM v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 139 (1976); Street, Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees v. L6ckridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289-90 (1971).
15. See generally Smith & Clark, Reappraisalof the Role of the States in Shaping Labor
Relations Law, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 411.
16. The term "strikebreaker" connotes any person who replaces a striking employee by
working in that striker's job. Strikebreaking laws refer to those laws regulating, in some
form, the use of strikebreakers by employers. See [1974] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), LRX 687.
17. See note 89 infra.
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state authority. For example, in Illinois v. Federal Tool & plastics,18 the
Illinois Supreme Court applied the preemption doctrine to invalidate a
state statute requiring an employer to advertise that a strike or lockout was
in progress when soliciting replacement employees.' 9 The court reasoned
that the right to hire replacements is an important economic weapon of an
employer and that the state statute encumbers the employer's use of this
weapon.2 ° The Superior Court of New Jersey reached a similar result in
its recent decision in Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey.2 ' In this case,
the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the New Jersey strikebreaking law prohibiting employers and third parties to a labor dispute from
transporting within the state, or supplying from without the state, or otherwise recruiting persons to replace lawfully striking employees. The statute
also prohibited third parties from recruiting any person to replace striking
employees.2 2 The court held that such a law "affects the economic balance
between employer and employee" and is thus preempted under the
LMRA.2 3
Despite these decisions, the absence of federal circuit court or Supreme
Court decisions in this area renders it unsettled. Furthermore, the proliferation of state strikebreaker laws elevates the preemption issue to one of
national concern and increases the likelihood of future challenges. This
Note will review the decisions that have shaped the preemption doctrine in
the labor field. It will then analyze the doctrine's possible effects on three
catgegories of strikebreaking laws: restrictions on employer recruiting and
18. 62 Ill. 2d 549, 344 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
19. Act of July 16, 1941, § 1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2(c), (d) (1971). Section 2(c)
provides: "No employer shall advertise seeking to hire employees to replace employees on
strike or locked out during any period when a strike or lockout is in progress ... unless it
shall be stated in such advertisement that a strike or lockout is in progress at such place of
business."
20. 62 Ill. 2d at 554, 344 N.E.2d at 4.
21. No. L-21147-79 (N.J. Super. Ct., June 13, 1980) (oral decision), appeal docketed,
No. A-4767-79-TI (App. Div. Aug. 11, 1980).
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13 C-I, 2, 3, (West 1965). Section 34:13 C-I provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, partnership or corporation to import
from outside the boundaries of the State of New Jersey or to transport within the
State of New Jersey or to supply from without the State any person or persons for
the purpose of being or becoming employed with an object of:
c) replacing in employment any employees of any employer who are lawfully on
strike or who have been locked out.
Section 34:13 C-2 provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation not directly involved in a strike or lockout, to recruit any person or persons for
employment ...."
23. Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, No. L-21147-49, slip op. at 48 (N.J. Super.
Ct. June 13, 1980).
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hiring of replacements; restrictions on third party soliciting and recruiting
of replacements; and requirements that employers and third parties give
notice of a strike or lockout to replacements. 24 This examination will
demonstrate that those strikebreaking laws falling within the first two categories cannot survive the preemption test and therefore must fall. Those
statutes requiring an employer or third party to give notice of a labor dispute, however, are legitimate exercises of state police powers and should
not be preempted by federal labor laws.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE TO SECURE A

NATIONAL LABOR POLICY

The Supreme Court has recognized two lines of preemption in the labor
field. 25 The first line was developed in Garner,Central Storage& Transfer
Co. v. Teamsters Local 776,26 expanded in San Diego Building Trades
Council Local 2020 v. Garmon,27 and modified in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
San Diego County District Council of Carpenters.28 The recently articulated second line was announced in Lodge 76, InternationalAssociation of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission .29 An understanding of both lines provides a framework for all preemption analysis in
labor law.
A.

Garner-Garmon-Sears: Conduct Protectedand Prohibited
Under the Act

Conduct clearly or arguably regulated by the LMRA falls within the
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB and comprises the first line of preemption. The Court expounded the first stage of this theory in Garner,Central
Storage. The union had placed picketers at the employer's place of business in an attempt to organize the employees. The employer claimed this
was an unfair labor practice in violation of Pennsylvania law.30 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, reversing the lower court, held that the state law
24. See notes 94-97 and accompanying text infra.
25. Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 138.
26. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
27. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).

28. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
29. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
30. 346 U.S. at 486-87. An unfair labor practice is defined under the LMRA as employer or labor organization conduct which is specifically proscribed under Section 8 of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). The Pennsylvania statute defines the term similarly. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 211.2, 211.6 (Purdon 1964).
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was preempted. 3 ' The United States Supreme Court agreed, holding that
the NLRB had sole power to act in the controversy since the conduct fell
either under the protection of section 732 or the prohibition of section 831
of the LMRA.34
This line of preemption continued in Garmon, where the employer
sought, under California law, both an injunction to restrain peaceful union
picketing by employees to gain union recognition and damages for loss of
business. The California Supreme Court had granted both remedies, but
the United States Supreme Court remanded for consideration in the light
of its recent decisions.31 On reconsideration, the California court set aside
the injunction while sustaining the damages. 36 Granting certiorari a second time, the United States Supreme Court, dismissing any distinction between remedies,3 7 held that since it was unclear whether the union conduct
was protected or prohibited, the better course was to preempt the state
court as a tribunal of primary jurisdiction. 3' The Garmon decision ex31. Garner, Central Storage Co. v. Teamsters Local 776, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A.2d 893 (1953).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). "Employees shall have the right to self organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities ... and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities." Id
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). This section enumerates examples of prohibited conduct
considered to be unfair labor practices. Paragraph (a) lists employer unfair labor practices,
proscribing, for example, interference with employees in the exercise of their rights under
section 7, domination or interference with the formation or administration of a union, and
bad faith bargaining. Paragraph (b) lists union unfair labor practices, proscribing, for example, interference with employees in the exercise of their rights and bad faith bargaining.
34. See 346 U.S. at 489. The Court rejected Garner's contention that the NLRB enforces only public rights and that the instant action concerned private rights. It held that the
conflict lay in remedies, not rights, and if separate remedies were brought to bear, they could
cause conflict. Id at 498-99.
35. The recent Supreme Court decisions were Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353
U.S. 1 (1957) and Meat Cutters v. Firlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957). These decisions
held that "the refusal of the National Labor Relations Board to assert jurisdiction did not
leave with the States power over activities they otherwise would be preempted from regulating." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 238 (1959). But see note 40
infra .
36. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
The California court had based its decision on a combination of state tort law and labor law,
holding that the picketing was a tort since picketing was an unfair labor practice under state
law. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 239.
37. "Thus, judicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of the activities which
the States have sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted." 359
U.S. at 243.
38. Id. at 246. The federal labor laws were passed because of the "perceived incapacity
of the common-law courts and state legislatures" to apply informed and consistent rules and
because of the need for a centralized policy to balance labor and management. Street, Elec.
Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286.
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panded Garner, CentralStorage by acknowledging not only that activities
clearly protected and prohibited by the LMRA are the exclusive province
of the NLRB, but also that those activities arguably protected by section 7
or prohibited by section 8 are likewise within the Board's primary jurisdiction.39 The states must defer to the Board's determination of whether the
conduct challenged is actually protected or prohibited.4" State regulation
of areas potentially subject to federal law, in the Court's view, would create serious conflicts in the application of a national labor policy. 4 ' The
Garmon principle stood unscathed for nineteen years.4 2
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters,the Court narrowed the preemption theory constructed in Garner, CentralStorage and Garmon. Like Garmon, the case involved peaceful picketing on the employer's property, and the employer sought an
injunction in state court to restrain the trespass. 4 The Supreme Court, in
a retreat from its previous decisions, held that the Garmon principle could
not be applied woodenly lest it sweep too broadly by usurping state court
jurisdiction over traditionally local matters.4 4 The Court first examined
39. 359 U.S. at 245. "When an activity is arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of
the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to
be averted." Id
40. Id The Court also noted that the fact that the Board declined to assert jurisdiction
over the dispute did not affect the preemption analysis. If the activity was protected or
prohibited, a state could not interject itself regardless of the Board's refusal to decide the
dispute. Id. at 245-46. The effect of this decision, which left the parties without a forum in
which to litigate, was alleviated that same year with the passage of the LMRDA, which
permitted state and federal courts to assert jurisdiction when the Board had declined. 29
U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1976).
41. 359 U.S. at 246.
42. The Garmon rule evolved from judicial trial and error and represents the best rule
that can be applied easily and consistently by the courts. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San
Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. at 216 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Court traced this evolution in Lodge 76. 427 U.S. at 138-39. First, the Court posited that the
distinction lay between general state common law and specific state legislation directly regulating labor-management relations. United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement
Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 645 (1958). A second approach was to refuse to preempt
when the state applied a remedy not available under federal law. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 479-80 (1955). The third approach was a case-by-case determination of
whether the state court actually arrived at a conclusion inconsistent with the federal statute.
E.g., International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949). Finally, in Garmon the Court determined that it must look at the conduct being
regulated and set down a rule of predictable judicial application. 427 U.S. at 139.
43. 436 U.S. at 183.
44. Id. at 188-89. Justice Brennan argued that the majority was creating a potentially
broad and dangerous exception which would cast aside the Garmon rule which had weathered 20 years of experience. Id at 215-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In reality, the Garmon principle had never been applied "woodenly" because the Court
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the "arguably prohibited conduct" and stated that the sole reason for this
wing of Garmon was to protect the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.4" State
regulation would not be preempted, therefore, unless the controversy
presented to the state was "identical" to that which could have been
brought before the NLRB. The Court reasoned that "it is only [then] that
a state court's exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board."4 6 Thus,
after Sears, the key question regarding the prohibited wing of Garmon was
whether the state and the Board would be focusing on the same aspects of
the challenged conduct.4 7
The Sears court then considered the "arguably protected conduct" exception and stated dual reasons for this wing: the NLRB primary jurisdiction and the supremacy concern of safeguarding federally protected
conduct.4 8 When a plaintiff in a state proceeding has no method for invoking the Board's jurisdiction, and the defendant fails to do so, there is "no
risk of overlapping jurisdiction."49 There is, however, still a danger that
the state court could prohibit conduct protected by federal law. In this
situation, in which there is significant risk that a misinterpretation of federal law could result in the prohibition of protected conduct, a state can
therefore still be preempted from acting, despite the unavailability of the
NLRB as a forum. In such a case, the state court must weigh the risk of an
erroneous state court adjudication against the consequence of the absence
of any forum in which to litigate the state claim or the protected conduct
issue.5"
Sears, in effect, created exceptions to the Garner-Garmon line of preemption. While the primary inquiry in each case remained whether the
conduct sought to be regulated by the states was actually or arguably protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the -LMRA, the method of
analysis was significantly altered. Sears, however, did not change the rationale underlying the Garner-Garmon line of preemption: that is, the prihad created numerous exceptions to the doctrine. See notes 67-83 and accompanying text
infra.

45. 436 U.S. at 197.
46. Id
47. In Sears, the state court, in a trespass action, would be adjudicating the locus of the
picketing, while the Board would be concerned primarily with the Union's objective for the
picketing. Id at 198.
48. Id at 199-200.
49. Id at 201.
50. Id at 206-07. The Court reasoned that in some circumstances the state may not act
despite the lack of a federal forum since Congress may have preferred the "costs inherent in
a jurisdictional hiatus to the frustration of national labor policy which might accompany the
exercise of state jurisdiction." Id at 203.
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mary jurisdiction and the federal supremacy issues. In contrast, the second
line of labor preemption is analytically distinct from the Garner-Garmon
line, permitting preemption of conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited by the LMRA.
B. Lodge 76: Avoiding Conflicts With the NationalLabor Policy
The Supreme Court implicitly suggested the existence of a second line of
preemption in Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton. In this case, a striking
union persuaded a customer of the primary employer to terminate business
dealings with that employer. The employer brought suit against the union
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, alleging violations of both the LMRA and Ohio common law.52 The court
found a violation of both and assessed actual and punitive damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.5 3 The Supreme Court found that the union's
conduct was not a secondary boycott of the kind prohibited by section 303
of the LMRA, since the union had not used coercion against the customer's employees in garnering the customer's support.54 The Court nonetheless held that Ohio law was preempted, reasoning that Congress, by
enacting section 303, had occupied the field and thus implicitly intended to
leave all unaddressed matters in this area free from state regulation. 55
Congress, in the Court's view, struck a balance between the competing interests of labor and management when it "select[ed] which forms of economic pressures should be prohibited by section 303." 56 The Court
considered it crucial that areas neither expicitly protected nor prohibited
by section 303 should remain unregulated and available to the parties to
the extent that this would effectuate national labor policy.57
This second line of preemption came to fruition in Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,58 where the Court explicitly identified the existence of the two
51. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
52. Id at 253-54. The employer sought damages due to business losses, claiming that

the customer interference was unprotected conduct under the Act and a tortious conspiracy
under Ohio common law. Morton v. Local 20, Teamsters, 200 F. Supp. 653, 656 (N.D. Ohio
1961).
53. Morton v. Local 20, Teamsters, 320 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1963).
54. 377 U.S. at 259.
55. Id at 258.
56. Id at 258-59 (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 257 U.S. 93,
98 (1958)).
57. Id at 259-60.
58. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). While the Lodge 76 decision definitively identified this second
line of preemption, it observed that the Garner Court recognized the unacceptability of a
state "imping[ing] on the area of labor combat designed to be free." Id at 144 (quoting
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lines.59 Here, the union members, protesting a contract dispute, refused to
work overtime. The employer filed unfair labor practice charges against
the union with both the NLRB and the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission (WERC). The Regional Director for the NLRB dismissed
the charge, ruling that the conduct was not regulated under the LMRA.6 °
The WERC, however, held that the concerted activity was an unfair labor
practice under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed.6 '
Since the conduct was neither protected nor prohibited under federal law,
any attempt to displace state law could not rest on the Garner-Garmonline
of preemption. The Supreme Court held that the state law was preempted
since enforcement of the state statute would allow the state to determine
the validity of an economic weapon used by the union in the normal
course of collective bargaining. Such a result, the Court determined,
would be contrary to congressional intent as manifested in the federal labor laws.6 2
Premised on a finding that the conduct is neither clearly nor arguably
protected by section 7 nor prohibited by section 8 of the LMRA, the second line of inquiry, therefore, is whether the conduct should nonetheless
be unregulated because Congress left it "to be controlled by the free play
of economic forces." 63 This theory is based on the supposition that ConGarner, Central Storage Co. v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. at 500). It also made clear that the
decision in Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964), while not explicitly enunciating the rationale, was based on the second line of preemption. 427 U.S. at 146.
59. 427 U.S. at 138.
60. ld at 134-35.
61. Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 67 Wis. 2d 13, 226
N.W.2d 203 (1975).
62. 427 U.S. at 148-50. The majority expressly overruled International Union, U.A.W.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (Briggs-Stratton)decided 17
years earlier. 427 U.S. at 141, 151, 154-55. The Court in Briggs-Stratton had held that since
the union disrupted work by calling meetings during work time, the meetings were not protected or prohibited under the Act, and the state could assert jurisdiction.
For a critical analysis of the Lodge 76 preemption theory, see Note, State Regulation of
PeacefulSelf-He Conduct is Preemptedby NationalLabor Policy-Lodge 76, Int'l.Ass'n. of
MachinistsandAerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 26 DEPAUL
L. REV. 696 (1977). The author contends that Morton creates a "no-man's land" where
neither federal courts nor states can act. Even conduct having a minimal effect on commerce is precluded from state regulation despite the lack of clear congressional intent that
the conduct should remain entirely unregulated in all cases. Id at 706 n.52.
63. 427 U.S. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)). One
commentator suggests there should be only one type of preemption, the Morton-Lodge 76
type, which assesses more fairly whether conduct was meant to be left exclusively to the
federal government. See Cox, supra note 1,at 1359. It should be noted that although Professor Cox's article was written prior to Lodge 76, he correctly assessed the impact and direction of Morton, by advocating a Lodge 76 analysis. The Court, in fact, cited Professor Cox's
article in its description of the second-line preemption in Lodge 76. 427 U.S. at 140 n.4.
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gress intended certain conduct to be left available to the parties in order to
maintain the delicate balance between them in collective bargaining under
the federal scheme.' This line is, therefore, analytically distinct from the
first line of preemption.6 5 The Court summarized this type of preemption
as a question of whether the states' attempts to restrict or prohibit "self
help would frustrate effective implementation of the policies of the National Labor Relations Act." 66
C Exceptions to the Preemption Doctrine
The Supreme Court has identified exceptions to the first line of preemption." Under certain conditions, a state may, through its courts or its legislature, restrict or regulate certain conduct even though this intervention
may encroach upon federal labor policy. The circumstances under which
states may so regulate conduct may be grouped into three categories. The
first category of exceptions consists of those instances in which Congress
explicitly or implicitly authorized states to act.68 The second exception is
64. Id at 150. The Court's task is often one of "deciphering an unexpressed intent of
Congress." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. at 187. This is made all the more difficult because, although the LMRA leaves much to
the states, Congress has not specified the parameters of their authority. See Garner, Central
Storage Co. v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. at 488. See also Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 289.
Some members of the Court had rejected this implied congressional intent theory. Justice
Stevens commented in Lodge 76 that Congress never considered the conduct in question,
and its lack of expression does not imply that Congress intended to leave the conduct unregulated. 427 U.S. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the majority view has prevailed.
Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality in New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of
Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979), joined by Justice Rehnquist who had joined Justice Stevens in
his Lodge 76 dissent, accepted the theory that Congress may have intended to leave unfettered conduct which is neither protected nor prohibited under the Act. Id at 530.
65. See Cox, supra note 1,at 1346. Professor Cox termed this category of preemption
"permitted activities." These are acts which are neither protected nor prohibited by the
labor laws but which are permitted because the states may not interfere.
66. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. at 531; Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969) (interpreting the
Railway Labor Act).
67. Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-98
(1971).
68. Farmer v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 297 (1977).
For example, state courts have explicit authority to enforce collective bargaining agreements
under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). See Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S.
195 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). Under § 303, 29
U.S.C. § 187 (1976), individuals may recover damages in state court for injuries sustained
due to secondary boycott activity prohibited in § 8(b)(4) even where the unfair labor practice
can be remedied by Board action.
An example of implicit state court authority is illustrated by New York Tel. Co. v. New
York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. at 540-44. In that case it was determined that congres-
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in the instance of state interest in traditionally local concerns." Specifically, state assertions of jurisdiction have been supported when the state
has had an overriding traditional interest in protecting its citizens against
such conduct as mass picketing,7" threats of violence, 7 ' malicious libel,72
and intentional infliction of emotional distress." The third category of
exceptions consists of those circumstances in which state regulation would
have only a minimal effect on the collective bargaining relationship or be
only a peripheral concern to the federal labor laws.74 An alleged wrongful
expulsion of a union member from union membership, 75 and a charge that
a union statement against an agent of the employer was knowingly false
and thus libelous76 are examples of issues which have been so labeled. In
another judically created area the Court has waived preemption where a
particular rule of law is so structured and administered that state review
would not jeopardize federally protected interests.7 7
Finally, some members of the Supreme Court have indicated that a state
may enforce neutral laws of general applicability because of their indirect
sional intent to permit states to pay strikers unemployment benefits was based on the legislative history of the NLRA and the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 501-504
(1976).
69. This exemption is stated in Garmon as "where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling
congressional direction we could not infer that Congress had deprived the states to act." 359
U.S. at 244. Accord, Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 296 (1977); Street, Elec.
Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 290 (1971); Local 20, Teamsters
v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 257 (1964); Allen-Bradley Local I111 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942).
70. E.g., United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634 (1958).
71. E.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1953).
72. E.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 144, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
73. E.g., Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
74. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).
75. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). But see Street,
Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), which made clear
that the implication in Gonzales that any union member conflict is an appropriate area for
state action, cannot survive the Garmon preemption analysis. Thus Gonzales must be read
as permitting state action because the conduct in question was only of peripheral concern to
the NLRA, focusing exclusively on the union constitution and by-laws. Id. at 295-97.
76. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 144, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
77. See Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. at 298. See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967) on the issue of the duty of fair representation owed by the union to its
members. The Court in Vaca stated that the reasons for this exception were threefold: the
courts had developed the law of fair representation, the NLRB had no greater expertise in
these cases, and preemption might eliminate judicial review. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 28 (1977).
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effect on labor policy. 7" The precedent, however, consistently and unambiguously suggests that such distinctions should not be made. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Garmon, noted that it was of no
consequence whether a state acted under a law of general applicability or
one narrowly directed toward labor-management relations.7 9 This confusion may explain the dicta in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters.80 In
Sears, the majority reasoned that preemption concerns, which seek to
avoid a multiplicity of tribunals and to promote uniform application of the
laws, are most relevant when applied to state laws regulating the collective
bargaining process. 8 ' Sears made clear, however, that laws of general applicability when invoked in a labor dispute will be preempted if the state
laws regulate conduct also regulated by the federal Act.8 2 The Court is
presently split on whether laws of general applicability deserve different
treatment.8 3
While these exceptions clearly apply to the first line of preemption, the
Court has never held that they similarly apply to the second line. A majority of the Court in New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department
of Labor, 4 however, implicitly extended the exception of "interests so
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" to the second line of preemption by integrating this exception into its Lodge 76 analysis.8 5 This
78. Thus, in his concurring opinion in Lodge 76, Justice Powell argues that states
should be free to enforce such neutral laws dealing with torts, contracts, and other important
public policy concerns which have an incidental effect on federal labor policy, unless Congress has specified to the contrary. 427 U.S. at 156 (Powell, J., concurring). Actually, Powell's elucidation could be interpreted as being synonymous with the "peripheral concerns"
and "deeply rooted local interests" exceptions. See notes 69-76 and accompanying text
supra.
In New York Tel. Co. P.New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, the plurality approached the problem by placing a lighter burden on laws of general applicability and
surmised that a congressional desire to preempt state enforcement of general laws is more
difficult to infer than the intent to preempt enforcement of laws directed specifically at
union-management activities. Id at 533.
79. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244. See also Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. at 197; Farmer v.
Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. at 300. But see Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen &
Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963), where preemption was found, despite the assertion of a general common law tort, breach of contract.
80. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
81. Id at 192 (quoting Garner, Central Storage Co. v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. at 498-99).
82. Id at 193.
83. There were four separate opinions in New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't
of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979). The plurality opinion and Justice Brennan's concurrence
suggest a distinction should be made. Justice Blackmun's concurrence and Justice Powell's
dissent reject any such distinction.
84. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
85. See id at 539-40 (dicta); id at 550 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 560 (Powell, J.,
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approach seems logical because it would be incongruous to allow, for example, states to prohibit threats of violence during employee picketing, a
first line preemption case,86 but to then deny the states the same right when
the threats arise during a concerted refusal to work overtime, a second line
case.87 Finally, since the Lodge 76 line of preemption is premised on an
implied congressional intent to leave conduct unregulated, specific congressional authorization to allow state action would logically be another
exception to the second line of preemption.
From the foregoing review of federal preemption case law, a framework
can be developed within which to analyze all preemption issues in the field
of labor relations. The first step is to determine, under the Garner-GarmonSears line, whether the activity the state seeks to regulate is clearly or arguably protected or prohibited by the LMRA. If the activity is not protected or prohibited, the next step is to determine if the state regulation,
under the Lodge 76 line, would frustrate national labor policy. If it would
not, then the state action is not preempted.
When the activity is actually or arguably prohibited by section 7, states
are not preempted unless the controversy presented to the state court is
"identical" to that which could have been presented to the Board. If the
conduct is actually protected by section 7, states are preempted. If the conduct is only arguably protected, states are also preempted unless the aggrieved party has no method of presenting his claim to the NLRB, the
opposing party fails to raise the issue with the Board, and the consequences of denying the aggrieved party a forum outweigh the risk of state
court misinterpretation of federal law. If the state regulation is not protected or prohibited but would frustrate the effective administration of federal labor policy, it will be preempted.
Finally, regardless of the foregoing, preemption will not occur: (1) when
there is congressional intent to permit the state to act; (2) when there are
"interest[s] so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility";8 8 or (3)
when the conduct regulated is only of peripheral concern to the federal
labor laws. All of these exceptions apply to the Garner-Garmon line and
arguably, the first two apply to the Lodge 76 line as well.
dissenting). One could also infer from the tone of the Lodge 76 decision that the Court, at

that time, had no doubts about extending the exceptions. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
86. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
88. See note 69 supra.
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PREEMPTION THEORY AS APPLIED TO STATE
STRIKEBREAKING LAWS

A. State StrikebreakingLaws
Strikebreaking laws, as referred to in this Notq, are those statutes that, in
varying forms and degrees, regulate the hiring, transporting, recruiting, or
supplying of workers to replace employees engaged in a strike or subjected
to a lockout. Thirty states have such laws,89 some of which were enacted
prior to the passage of the National Labor Relations Act.9" Although the
preemption doctrine as it relates to the federal labor laws had not yet been
developed, many of these early statutes were unsuccessfully challenged
under constitutional theories of due process and equal protection.9 1 Recent challenges have resurrected these constitutional theories in conjunction with the preemption argument.9 2
89. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 973-974 (West 1971), §§ 1132-1136 (West Supp. 1980); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-2-104 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-121 (West 1958); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 703 (1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 379 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 2c
(1941), § 2f-h (Supp. 1980-81); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-16-1-12 (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE
ANN. §-732.6 (West 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 340.050(2) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23:901-:904 (West 1964); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 851-856, 921 (1974); MD. ANN CODE
art. 100, § 51A (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §§ 22-24, ch. 150 § 1-4 (West 1975);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 423.251-254, 423, 251 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.64-.65
(West 1966), § 184.38(10) (West Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41-2501 to -2505
(Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.010 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:11-:14, 275A:l to -A:5 (1977 & Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13 C-l, -2, -3, -5 (West 1965); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 34-13-15(10) (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4143.12(D) (Page 1973);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 167-168 (West 1951), tit. 40, § 55k (West Supp. 1979-80); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 629.210, 662.205, 662.215, 662.225 (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 557 (Purdon 1964), tit. 43, §§ 217.21-26 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 28-10-9 to 2810-14 (1979); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 60-6-19 to 60-6-21 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 50-204 to -205 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1621(a)(8); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 49.44.100, 49.44.110 (1962); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 103.43 (West 1974).
90. Eg., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 22 (West 1979) (originally passed, 1914
Mass. Acts ch. 237, §§ 1, 6); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-10-9 to 28-10-14 (originally passed, 1910
R.I. Pub. Laws § 3765); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 167 (West 1951) (originally passed,
1907-08 Okla. Sess. Laws, at 514, 1909 Okla. Comp. Laws § 4043).
91. See Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356, 103 N.E. 923 (1914) (upheld constitutionality of a notice statute); Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Wryn, 70 Okla. 247, 174 P. 280 (1918)
(upheld constitutionality of a notice statute); Biersach & Neidermeyer Co. v. State, 177 Wis.
388, 188 N.W. 650 (1922) (upheld constitutionality of a statute requiring notice to prospective workers of the existence of a labor dispute). But see Josma v. Western Steel Car &
Foundry Co., 249 Ill. 508, 94 N.E. 945 (1911) (held a notice statute void under the state
constitution); Matthews v. People, 202 Ill. 389, 67 N.E. 28 (1903) (statute held void for proscribing referral of replacement workers by employment offices).
92. See Alton Box Board Co. v. City of Alton, 77 L.R.R.M. 2123 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 26,
1971) (held that a city ordinance which prohibited hiring, recruiting, and referral of strikebreakers, was unconstitutional under the fifth and fourteenth amendments as a denial of due
process, equal protection, and the right to contract); Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey,
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The preemption doctrine remains the critical challenge to these statutes.93 For purposes of this analysis, strikebreaking laws will be grouped
into three categories: (1) laws proscribing the hiring, recruitment, or transport of replacement workers9 4 by employers engaged in labor disputes; 95
(2) laws proscribing the recruitment, transport, or referral of replacement
workers by third parties not involved in a labor dispute (often restricted to
the procurement of out-of-state workers); 96 and (3) laws requiring employers or third parties to give notice of a labor dispute when advertising for,
recruiting, or hiring replacements. 97 Although all of these laws affect the
hiring of replacements, their ability to withstand preemption scrutiny differs. The effects these laws are perceived to have upon federal labor relations policy are the key to whether such state regulation will be preempted.
B. An Employer's Right to Hire Replacements
Under common law, courts traditionally recognized the right of an employee to withhold his labor from his employer.9 8 When confronted with
No. L-21147-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 13, 1980) (court rejected a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness but held that the statute which proscribed hiring and recruitment of
replacements was void as a denial of due process and equal protection).
For a discussion of these statutes' validity under due process and the commerce clause, see
Comment, Anti-Strikebreaking Legislation-The Effect and Validity of State-Imposed CriminalSanctions, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 190 (1966).
93. In response to constitutional challenges directed at vagueness, privileges and immunities, freedom of speech, equal protection, due process, the commerce clause, freedom of
association, and the supremacy clause, the court in Chamber of Commerce responded "the
principal hurdle the statute must pass to stand constitutional muster is the issue of Federal
preemption." Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, No. L-21147-79, slip op. at 46 (N.J.
Super. Ct. June 13, 1980).
For cases which have considered the effects of preemption on strikebreaking legislation,
see Illinois v. Federal Tool & Plastics, 62 Ill. 2d 549, 344 N.E.2d 1 (1975); Warren v. State
Dep't of Labor, 313 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Bahr v. New York Tel. Co., 69 Misc. 2d
138, 329 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1972); Alton Box Board Co. v. City of Alton, 77 L.R.R.M. 2123 (S.D.
I11.Jan. 26, 1971); Milwaukee Cheese Co., 48 L.R.R.M. 1435 (Aug. 4, 1961).
94. While many statutes prohibit the hiring of any replacement workers, some statutes
specifically prohibit only professional strikebreakers. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 11321136 (West Supp. 1980) (a professional strikebreaker is defined as a person (other than supervisory personnel) who accepts employment where a labor dispute is in progress, on repeated occasions, within a five year period for the purpose of replacing striking employees).
95. Eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13C-1(c) (West 1965).
96. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 704 (1970).
97. Eg., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 379-3 (1976).
98. Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, 15 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1926); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842). It should be noted that in the early nineteenth century the right to strike was prohibited under the criminal conspiracy doctrine. See
Commonwealth v. Pullis (The Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case) (Mayor's Ct., Phila. Pa.
1806) reprintedin J. COMMONS & E. GILMORE, 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, 59-248 (2d ed. 1910).
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the concerted pressures of a strike, however, employers often have reacted
offensively by hiring strikebreakers to replace striking employees, guards
to protect the strikebreakers and the property, spies to circulate among the
picket lines, and armed men to break a strike through force and violence.9 9
The very hiring of strikebreakers itself was often the cause of violence especially when replacements were professional strikebreakers with little or
no technical job skills who simply wished to prolong the strike for their
own financial benefit.' °" By hiring replacements the employer hoped to
break the strike and continue the normal operations of the business.
The right of employees to organize has been upheld as a fundamental
right.'' To advance that right and to ensure employees an effective voice
in determining the terms and conditions of their employment, the NLRA
was enacted, 10 2 guaranteeing employees the right to engage in concerted
activities, including the right to strike.' 0 3 If the NLRA raised any doubts as
to workers' employment status during a strike, or as to the employer's right
to terminate a striking employee, those doubts were soon extinguished in
the landmark decision of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. " The
union struck Mackay when the latter failed to execute an agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment. Mackay replaced the striking employees with employees from its other offices in order to maintain
services. When the strike ended, Mackay rehired all but five of the striking
employees, asserting that the five had been permanently replaced. 0 5 The
Supreme Court held that the employer had committed an unfair labor
practice in violation of section 8(a) of the NLRA °6 by discriminatorily
refusing to rehire the five employees who had been active in union affairs.
99. See generally I. BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS (1960).
100. See generally P. TAFT, ECONOMICS AND PROBLEMS OF LABOR 497, 500 (3d ed.
1955); A. TAYLOR, LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR LAW 450-52 (2d ed. 1939); L. MACDONALD, LABOR PROBLEMS ON THE AMERICAN SCENE 611-13 (1938).
101. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I, 5, 33 (1937).
102. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-166 (1976)).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). This section has been interpreted as protecting the right to
strike. See Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963).
This right is qualified. Whether a strike is protected depends on the objective sought and the
means used to obtain it. The objectives and the means may not be unlawful nor may they
contravene the basic policies of the LMRA. See Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
104. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
105. Id at 339.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). This section provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." Id
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The Court's comments in Mackay concerning the employer's right to replace strikers were highly significant, as discussed below.
The Court first distinguished a strike over economic terms and conditions of employment (an economic strike) from a strike precipitated by an
unfair labor practice (a ULP strike). It then stated that an employer could
not permanently replace ULP strikers but could replace economic strikers
so long as such replacements were not discriminatory against employees
engaged in union activities." 7 The employer is "guilty of no act denounced by the statute," in permanently replacing economic strikers, the
Mackay Court reasoned, since the employer has the right to protect its
business.' 8 Although this pronouncement has been criticized as dictum, ' 9 it has been followed consistently to this day. 1 o
Mackay established that section 8(a) of the NLRA does not prohibit an
employer from permanently replacing economic strikers. Neither does section 7 protect this employer activity.1"' Since the replacement of economic
strikers, which is what strikebreaking laws seek to regulate, is neither
clearly or arguably protected nor prohibited by the Act, regulation of this
conduct through strikebreaking laws would not be subject to a Garner-Garmon preemption analysis." 2 Such regulation, however, would be subject
107. 304 U.S. at 345.
108. Id. at 345-46.
109. See Getman, The Protection0/Economic Pressureby Section 7 of the NationalLabor
Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1203-04 (1967); Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 631 (1966).
110. See NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 50 (1972); NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967); Meat Cutters & Butchers Local 576 v. Wetterau Food,
Inc., 597 F.2d 133, 138 (8th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 597 F.2d
7, 10 (1st Cir. 1979).
111. Section 7 of the LMRA protects only employee conduct without corresponding protection for employer activities. Mackay Radio held that the employer "has [not] lost the
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers." 304
U.S. at 345. Although a cursory reading of the language may lead one to conclude that
employers have a statutorily protected right to hire replacements, the decision is based on
the silence of the LMRA and merely states that the Board has no right to prohibit such
conduct.
112. See text accompanying notes 30-42 supra. One commentator suggests that such laws
are arguably subject to the jurisdiction of the LMRA because the NLRB has found the
employer guilty of an unfair labor practice when it has replaced strikers under certain conditions, such as giving "superseniority" over strikers. See Comment, supra note 92, at 211.
However, the unfair labor practice is not the act of replacing striking employees; rather, it is
the employer's discrimination against such employees because of their union activity, with
the objective of discouraging union membership or other protected union conduct. NLRB
v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233-35 (1963). Therefore, the act of replacing striking
employees is the "aspect" of the employer's conduct regulated by these state strikebreaking
statutes while the discrimination against strikers is the "aspect" of the employer's conduct
regulated in cases involving the granting of superseniority to replacements. Thus, the con-
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to Morton-Lodge 76 preemption analysis." 13 Preemption examination of
strikebreaking statutes, then, must determine whether restriction of the
employer's ability to replace striking employees would frustrate the purpose of the national labor policy or the implementation of the labor
laws."' 4 Although Morton, Lodge 76, and the majority of the other preemption cases concern impediments to union activities, the Supreme Court
has left no doubt that the preemption doctrine applies equally to regulations affecting employers. The Lodge 76 opinion noted that the crucial
question regarding preemption remains the same whether the conduct is
15
that of the union or the employer."
C. FrustratingNationalLabor Policy
Whether strikebreaking laws obstruct federal labor policy is a factual
determination." 6 As discussed above, strikebreaking laws generally prohibit or restrict employer hiring of replacement workers. Hiring replacements is an economic self-help measure which an employer can use to
combat a strike. A strike will usually be more successful, and hence a
union will usually be more successful in winning concessions, when the
union's economic strength outweighs that of the employer. The effectiveness of an employer's defense will depend, in part, on the availability of
other labor and on the employer's ability to recruit workers.' 17 The
Supreme Court has consistently stressed the importance of freedom to engage in self-help and the disruptive effect curtailment of that freedom
would have on the collective bargaining process." 8 Consequently, any attempt to restrict the economic weapons an employer may utilize to combat
troversies are not "identical" and the arguably prohibited wing of Garner-Garmondoes not
compel preemption. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
113. See text accompanying notes 51-66 supra.
114. See Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 14748.
115. Id at 147.
116. In ITT Lamp Div. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933
(1971), the First Circuit stated that the question of whether providing welfare assistance to

strikers would tip the balance between labor and management requires a finding of fact
which balances those state and federal interests. The impact on collective bargaining and on
strikers of a grant or denial of welfare must be calculated and evaluated. Id at 993. But the
court suggested that the mass of information needed indicates that Congress is the proper

forum to resolve the issue. Id at 993-94.
117. Smith & DeLancey, The State Legislatures and Unionism, 38 MICH. L. REV. 987,

991 (1940).
118. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. at 259-60; Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 146; NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at
489; Local 1976, Carpenters & Joiners Union v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958). Cf H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108-109 (1970) (right of parties to use self-help even
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the economic pressures of a strike will have significant influence on the
terms and conditions of employment negotiated by the parties.' 9 The
Supreme Court has warned that the determination of the permissible range
of self-help must be left to Congress and not to diverse state laws since
piecemeal, partisan interference could upset the delicate balance between
' The right of employers to secure their demands
labor and management. 20
at the bargaining table through resort to economic self-help has been unequivocally defended.' 2
Consequently, the prohibitive effect that the first category of strikebreaking laws-those regulating the conduct of the struck company-has
on the employer's ability to hire replacements suggests that such legislation
upsets the balance struck by the federal labor laws. The employer's success in hiring replacements could affect the outcome of the dispute or discourage employees from pursuing a strike for fear of losing their jobs.
Mackay established that the use of replacements was a legitimate eco22
nomic weapon to be used by the employer to protect his or her business.'
The court in Chamber of Commerce, presented with an attack on the New
Jersey strikebreaking statute, found that a critical element in the balance
of power in collective bargaining is the employer's prime economic
weapon of replacing strikers.' 23 Clearly, restraint on the employer's ability
to hire replacements interferes with an economic self-help measure and
consequently upsets the balance between labor and management in collecthough NLRB and courts might find that resort to self-help in some instances, might actually disrupt industrial peace and lead to a one-sided agreement).
The term "self-help" refers to actions taken by the parties in a labor dispute which (1)
advance that party's economic interests, (2) are within a party's own power, and (3) are
maintained by a party's economic resources, thus excluding any recourse to the courts or the
NLRB. Perhaps the ultimate self-help weapons are the union's strike and the employer's
lockout. See generally NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
119. See Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 144;

NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 490.
120. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 381
(1969) (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 691
(1963)).
121. The Court has upheld the use of an offensive lockout after an impasse in negotiations but prior to a strike, American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), and the
use of a lockout and temporary replacements by a nonstruck member of a multiemployer
bargaining group in support of a struck member of the multiemployer group, NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
122. 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
123. See Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, No. L-21147-79, slip op. at 48 (N.J.
Super. Ct. June 13, 1980). See also Illinois v. Federal Tool & Plastics, 62 Ill. 2d 549, 554, 344
N.E.2d 1, 4 (1975) (the right to hire replacements is an important economic weapon left to
the employer by Congress).
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tive bargaining: this "frustrates the effective implementation" of federal
24
labor policy.1
A somewhat different question is raised with the second category of
strikebreaking laws, that is, those laws which regulate third parties. Although this class of legislation is not directed at the parties to the dispute, it
nevertheless adversely affects an employer's ability to secure replacements
by interdicting an employer's ability to obtain willing workers through employment agencies or through other employers within the same industry.
The third category of laws, notice statutes, does not prohibit the hiring
of replacements, but does restrict the employer's ability to solicit those
replacements. The notice requirements presumably discourage some
otherwise potential replacement employees from interfering in a labor dispute. By thus inhibiting an employer's ability to maintain business operations, these statutes tip the balance in the collective bargaining process in
in turn, frustrates effective implementation of
favor of the union. This,
25
federal labor policy.1
An apparent dichotomy emerges in that notice statutes provide potential
striker replacements with information so that they might make an informed decision about whether to intervene where a labor dispute is in
progress. Such information would appear to be completely consonant with
the national labor policies of promoting employee freedom to self-organize, to bargain collectively, and to engage or refrain from engaging in concerted activities.' 26 That this dichotomy is merely apparent, however, is
based on two factors. First, there is no support in a Lodge 76 preemption
for balancing the "good" effects with the "bad" effects of state regulation.
The fact that a notice statute may promote the effective administration of
124. Not all state regulation of replacements would necessarily frustrate federal labor
policy under this line of preemption. For example, a state might decide to proscribe discrimination against strikers in favor of replacements, see note 112 supra, or a state might
restrain the hiring of replacements who forcefully disrupt a strike. These regulations, however, may raise a Garner-Garmon preemption claim since they appear to regulate conduct
protected and prohibited under the Act.
If an employer sought to replace his strikers with professional strike breakers, see note 94
supra, the analysis would not change. The employer's self-help weapon is the right to hire
replacements. Whether a state prohibits the hiring of replacements or qualifies the type of
replacement who can be hired, the interference becomes one of degree. Thus both regulations would be equally impermissible.
125. See Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. at 14851. The court in Federal Tool & Plastics considered the validity of a notice statute and
determined that it frustrated the national labor policy. 62 Ill. 2d at 554, 344 N.E.2d at 4.
126. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1976) and note 32 supra. A potential replacement's interest in choosing whether or not to work where a labor dispute is in progress is not one just
of convenience, but can actually be a protected right. "[T]he right to engage in a sympathy
strike or honor another union's picket line is also protected" under § 7 of the LMRA. GaryHobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 744 (1974), enforced, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975).
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national labor policy in the area of employee free choice cannot mitigate
its frustrating effect upon the balance of economic strength in the bargaining process. 12 Second, while Lodge 76 defined the frustration of the effective administration of labor policy solely in terms of regulation of
economic weapons which upset the labor-management balance, this need
not be the sole method of frustrating labor policy. Any attempt by the
state to regulate an area occupied by the federal labor laws, either by curtailing rights or bestowing greater rights, could arguably frustrate the effective administration of federal labor policy, and thus fall within the
prohibitions of the second line of preemption. By analogy to the Lodge 76
line of cases, it could be argued that by enacting section 7, Congress occupied the field, thereby precluding regulation; 28 thus state notice statutes
could be preempted as attempts to extend or make more efficacious the
federally occupied area of section 7 rights.
Although strikebreaking statutes may interfere with the self-help weapons of an employer and thus have a frustrating effect on federal labor policy, it cannot necessarily be concluded that these laws are preempted. Two
exceptions to the doctrine must still be considered. First, it must be determined whether Congress intended to allow such state intervention in the
labor field. Second, it is necessary to ascertain whether this legislation is
an "interest deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility."
D. Congressional Intent.: Implications But No Guidance
The Lodge 76 preemption line was constructed upon the premise that
Congress intended to leave certain conduct unregulated. Congressional intent can be inferred from the unarticulated assumption that the state regulation of this conduct frustrates national labor policy. This interference,
however, can be displaced by specific congressional intent not to preempt
state action regardless of its effect on the labor policy.' 2 9 Neither the
127. See generally Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427

U.S. at 142-51.
128. Cf. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. at 258 (Congress occupied the field by
enacting section 303 of the LMRA). Indeed, the Morton court spoke in terms much broader
than economic self-help weapons. "The basic question, in other words, is whether 'in a case
such as this, incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal labor
law.'" Id. (quoting Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962)).
129. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519
(1979), where despite the fact that the plurality found that the payment of unemployment
benefits to strikers affected the balance of economic power during a strike, id at 532, Congress, through the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 501-04 (1976), implicitly
intended to allow such state regulations. 440 U.S. at 527, 532, 544. The plurality was not
content to rest its holding squarely on this implied intent and stressed the fact that the unemployment statute was a law of general applicability. Id at 533. The decision consisted of
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NLRA nor its amendments address the practice of replacing striking employees. The legislative history of the NLRA is similarly silent. There
was, however, a tacit recognition by Congress that employers may permanently replace economic strikers, as evidenced by the fact that the Senate
deleted language in a proposed bill that would have inhibited this practice.13° While the conclusion drawn may be that the NLRA should not
restrict the hiring of replacements, it does not necessarily follow that Congress also sought to preempt the states' power to regulate this conduct,
particularly since some state strikebreaking statutes were enacted prior to
the passage of the NLRA."'
Similarly, Congress failed to disclose any clear intent in resolving conflicts between state and federal authority when it passed the LMRA and
the LMRDA. The legislative history of the LMRA amendments merely
demonstrates the acceptance by Congress of the practice of hiring strikebreakers by acceeding to the Supreme Court's earlier decision in NLRB v.
Mackay Radio and subsequent NLRB decisions.13 2 Section 9(c)(3) of the
LMRDA amended the LMRA to allow replaced economic strikers to vote
with replacement workers in a representational election for as long as one
year after the commencement of the strike.' 3 3 In drafting this amendment,
the legislators, as they had done under the LMRA, assumed employers
four opinions. While no single opinion received majority support, a majority of the justices
agreed that legislative intent not to preempt was a significant factor.
130. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), originally provided that an individual employee
who replaced a striking employee was excluded from the NLRA definition of an employee.
While this provision implicitly recognized the employer's ability to replace strikers, it constricted that option by affording the replacement no statutory collective bargaining rights.
This language was dropped in subsequent bills without explanation. The Senate debates
suggest, from the proliferation of statements regarding the unfairness of this section to the
replaced worker, that the Senate realized that there existed strong opposition to discrimination against replacements. See generally To Create.4 NationalLabor Board-Hearingson S.
2926 Before the Senate Committee on Educationand Labor, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
1935, at 406 (1949).
131. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
132. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1947), reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 303 (1948), which
states that since the Board has ruled that an employer may replace an economic striker,
"[t]he bill writes the rule into the act." Interestingly, this bill allowed permanent replacement
but excluded a "strikebreaker," a worker who only works for the duration of the strike, from
the definition of an employee. Id
The Senate committee, in considering a striking employee's right to vote in a representational election, reported that "strikers permanently replaced have no right to reinstatement
(NLRB v. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333)," S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 25 (1947),
reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947, at 431 (1948).
133. 29 U.S.C. 159 (1976).
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could hire replacements without discussing the nature and scope of this
right.' 3 4 The legislative histories of the NLRA, LMRA, and LMRDA do
not indicate that Congress has left this issue to the states.
Two other federal statutes are of special concern because they restrict
the use of strikebreakers. The first is the Interstate Transportation of
Strike Breakers Act of 1936 (Byrnes Act),' 3 5 prohibiting the transport of
strikebreakers recruited to obstruct peaceful picketing or other federally
protected employee conduct by force or threats of violence. This legislation was passed to prevent the importation of armed and dangerous
136
"thugs" by professional agencies, and ultimately to prevent violence.
There is no indication in the legislative history that states would be allowed to further restrict the use of strikebreakers. An argument can thus
be made that if Congress thought it necessary to restrict the use of strikebreakers under other circumstances, it would have specifically done so.' 3 7
The second statute affecting strikebreakers is the Federal Employment
Service Act of 1933 (Wagner-Peyser Act). 138 Section 49j(b) of the Act provides that no person shall be referred by a state employment service to a
position vacant due to a labor strike or lockout without notice of such dispute. 139 The Secretary of Labor, under his regulatory authority, has extended this by prohibiting employment offices from making any referrals
where there is a labor dispute.' 4 o Two conflicting inferences may be drawn
from these restrictions. The first is a negative inference that, by regulating
only state employment offices, Congress intended to leave all other parties
free from government restraints. The other inference is that, since Congress requires notice to replacement employees and authorizes the Secretary of Labor to restrict referrals by state employment agencies, Congress
must have concluded that these restrictions were an acceptable interference with the national labor laws.14 ' These conflicting inferences render
legislative intent equivocal on the issue of preemption. The statute's legis134. See generallfy S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., 31-33 (1959), reprintedin I
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE

ACT, 1959, at 427-29 (1959).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (1976).
136. See 74 CONG. REC. 6654, 10218-22 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2431, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1936).
137. Cf. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (express language providing for a specific remedy implies an intent to exlude all other remedies).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 49j(b) (1976).
140. 20 C.F.R. § 602.2(b) (1979). This was held to be within the statutory authority of
the Secretary of Labor in DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Dep't of Employment, 13 Cal. Rptr. 663
(1961).
141. While the Wagner-Peyser Act was enacted in 1933, two years before the NLRA, it
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lative history is unenlightening, indicating merely that the probable purpose of section 49j(b) was to maintain governmental neutrality during a
strike and to avoid sending unemployed workers to areas where, but for
the strike, there was no actual shortage of competent manpower. 42 It is
doubtful that this rationale could authorize states, not concerned with federally funded public employment agencies, to control the use of strikebreakers among private parties.
In sum, the legislative histories of the NLRA, LMRA, and LMRDA
support a congressional acceptance of the use of strikebreakers during labor disputes. There exists a strong inference that Congress intended to
leave the practice unregulated. None of the statutes or their legislative
histories, reviewed alone, support a contrary inference of congressional intent to allow states to act in this area.
E Overriding State Interests in Support of Strikebreaking Statutes
The last hurdle that must be cleared in a preemption analysis is to determine whether state strikebreaking laws fall within the judically created ex' 43
ception of "interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.'
The Supreme Court in Farmerv. Carpenter'sUnion 44 set forth two factors
to be examined in reaching such a determination. The first is whether the
state's interest is a traditional concern of protecting its citizens from the
conduct in question which may override any federal concern. The second
is whether there is risk that the state action will interfere with the effective
administration of national labor policy.' 4 5 An important consideration in
this second determination is whether there exists a conflict between state
46
and federal administrative remedies.
The first factor-the presence of an overriding state interest-goes to the
can be argued that Congress could have repealed or modified this section if it had felt it
would disrupt the free play of economic forces.
142. A National Employment System. Hearings on S.688, S.1442, HR. 4305 Before the
Joint Committee on Labor, 66th Cong., IstSess., 31 (1919) (statement by Secretary of Labor
William Wilson). The Employment System bill was sponsored in Congress for a number of
years before it was finally passed in1933. In 1919, no bill contained the restrictive language
on notice to replacements found in the final legislation. However, the hearings in the 66th
Congress embody the clearest statement of the government's posture during a labor strike.
143. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra. These laws do not fall under the category
of rules of law so structured and administered as not to jeopardize federal interests. See
note 77 and accompanying text supra. Here there is no rule of law which the state courts are
seeking to review. Rather is it a law which, by its own terms, defines the permissible conduct
of employers.
144. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
145. Id at 303-04.
146. United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634,
644-45 (1958).
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heart of the "deeply rooted local feeling and responsibility" issue. The
Supreme Court's best example of such responsibilities is the state interest
in protecting the health and well-being of its citizens, which includes protection from physical injury, emotional distress, and damaged reputation.14 7 The Court has also approved as overriding such concerns as
protection of citizens from violence and threats of violence,, 48 from
breaches of the peace, 149 from obstruction of the highways,150 and from
destruction of property.' 5 1 If this is an all-inclusive list of local interests, as
two justices have suggested, 152 then the analysis of strikebreaking laws
under this exception requires a simple determination of whether any of the
enumerated categories are applicable. If this list is not exclusive, however,
the Court has offered little guidance in how to identify other compelling
state interests.
Various reasons have been advanced for the necessity of strikebreaking
laws. 153 The one most often advanced, which on its face conforms to the
list of Court-identified local interests, is that these statutes protect the public by preventing violence. Thus, in Chamber of Commerce, the state argued that the New Jersey statute was a legitimate exercise of the state's
police power because it sought to prevent the violence that can occur when
third parties are brought into a labor dispute. 154 Laws aimed at preventing
147. Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. at 302-303.
148. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964); Garner, Central Storage Co. v.
Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
149. See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Union, 383 U.S. 53, 57 (1966); Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
150. Allen Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740,
749 (1942); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 664 (1953).
151. Lodge 76, IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 136
(1976).
152. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979),
"[t]he Court has not extended this exception beyond a limited number of state interests that
are at the core of the States' duties and traditional concerns." Id at 550 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); the broad language in Garmon allowing state action in interests deeply rooted
in local feeling and responsibility "has been applied only to a narrow class of cases." Id at
560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
153. States might argue that the laws curtail violence and industrial unrest, embrace the
public policy by condemning persons who profit from industrial strife, or protect the jobs of
citizens of a municipality or state from persons outside the community or state and subsequently avoid community support of displaced employees in the form of welfare funds. See
Comment, supra note 92, at 201-04.
154. See Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, No. L-21147-79, slip op. at 48 (N.J.
Super. Ct. June 13, 1980). Indeed, the hiring of strikebreakers during the early years of
industrial organizing usually precipitated violence. See note 100 supra. In Illinois v. Federal
Tool & Plastics, 62 Ill. 2d 549, 344 N.E.2d 1 (1975), the state contended that the Illinois
statute was aimed at violence caused both by the strikebreakers against strikers and by strikers against the strikebreakers. 62 Ill. at 554, 344 N.E.2d at 3-4.
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violence or threats of violence, however, are to be distinguished from laws
aimed at preventing potential violence. In Garner, Central Storage, the
Court held that picketing could not be enjoined merely because it created a
potentially violent and disruptive situation; there must be actual violence
or obstruction.' 55
Strikebreaking statutes are not merely aimed at preventing violence or
threats of violence; these laws usually sweep broadly, prohibiting the solicitation or hiring of replacements, or requiring notice to replacements under
all conditions and circumstances. 56 As one court noted, striking down a
statute aimed at both employers and third parties, "[tlhe statute's prohibition would reach replacements even when hired in the peaceful exercise of
the employers [sic] right to maintain a balance of power with the employees [sic] union."' 5 7 The desirability of maintaining this balance suggests
that states cannot prohibit the solicitation or hiring of replacements, nor
can they require notice to replacements in every instance under the pretense of preventing violence. Since prevention of inherent or merely potential violence is not a legitimate state concern for the purposes of
preemption, these statutes will survive preemption only if narrowly drafted
to prohibit real or imminent violence or threats of violence, unless the
courts are willing to expand the list of local interests.
Another "overriding" state interest advanced is the need to safeguard
community jobs from persons outside the community or the state.158 This
may fit under either the broad category of protecting the health and wellbeing of the public at large or protecting the property rights of employees
in their jobs.' 5 9 But its effect is to protect the economic status of the strikers. Moreover, these statutes are overbroad in that they make no distinction between hiring permanent or temporary replacements, although some
distinguish between in-state and out-of-state solicitation. 60 If an em155. 346 U.S. at 488. Accord, Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969) (peaceful picketing is protected self-help under the Railway Labor
Act).
156. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §§ 22, 22A (West 1953); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:13 C-l(c) (West 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 167 (West 1951). The New Jersey

strikebreaking statute, to survive preemption, should be given a narrow construction limiting
its applicability "to situations in which a significant risk of violence is inherent." Brief for
Defendants at 16, Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, No. L-21147-79 (N.J. Super. Ct.
June 13, 1980) (oral decision).
157. See Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey, slip op. at 49.
158. See note 153 supra.

159. See text accompanying notes 147-51 supra.
160. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.

1981]

State Strikebreaking Laws and Preemption

ployer hired only temporary replacements, community members would retain their employment.
Finally, the objective of condemning persons who profit from industrial
strife 6' has also been suggested as an overriding state interest. But unlike
other state interests which motivate a state to indirectly enter the bargaining arena to protect those independent interests, this interest directly attacks the role of the parties in a labor dispute for its own sake. There is not
an independent local concern which can be separated from the actual interference with the bargaining process. Furthermore, a state's disapproval
of collective bargaining "warfare" is misplaced since Congress has determined that the potential for industrial strife is an integral part of our national labor policy. 162 To permit a state to condemn one party to a dispute
in the name of overriding state interest is to permit that state to frustrate
the foundations of the national labor policy. Surely this contradicts the
intent of Congress.
The third category of state strikebreaking statutes-the notice statutespresents an additional state interest. While holding that such a statute was
preempted, the Illinois Supreme Court in Illinois v. Federal Tool & Plastics
conceded the existence of an important state concern for preventing fraud
and promoting truth in advertising. 163 The court nonetheless held that the
notice statute was preempted.'" Relying on Morton, the court said the
statute impinges on the bargaining process and upsets the balance struck
by Congress. 16' The court's reasoning is sound but stops short of the full
preemption analysis. There is no attempt to identify the nature of the
overriding state interests exception and to determine whether truthful advertising might conform to these interests. 166
161. See note 153 supra.
162. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1970) ("agreement might in

some cases be impossible, and it was never intended that the Government would in such a
case step in. . . and impose its own views of a desirable settlement"); American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965) ("the act also contemplated resort to economic
weapons should more peaceful measures not avail"); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union,
361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960) ("the parties ... still proceed from contrary and to an extent
antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self interest. . . . The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the
system.").
163. 66 II1. 2d at 554, 344 N.E.2d at 3-4. The court also identified legitimate interests of
protecting against potential abuse and obloquy against replacements and their families and
against potential violence.
164. 62 I11. 2d at 554, 344 N.E.2d at 4.
165. Id at 554-55, 62 N.E.2d at 4-5.
166. The Illinois court suggests, in dicta, that it is dismissing the local interest question
because the state notice statute is not one of general applicability. See text accompanying
notes 78-83 supra. The court quotes a segment of Professer Cox' preemption article which
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A full examination of the overriding local interests exception may have
led the Illinois Supreme Court to a contrary result. Just as a state may act
to redress actual violence or threats of violence, so too may it act to redress
fraud or untruthful advertising to foster free, knowledgeable choices. Although truth in advertising is distinguishable from the important local interests previously identified as acceptable, this does not minimize its
importance. 167 States have a substantial interest in assuring that even
truthful advertising is communicated to the public accurately and fully,!68
and the public has a concurrent interest in receiving a free flow of undistorted commercial information.' 69 The state's concern for the free flow of
truthful information is an overriding interest no less vital than its concern
for the protection of its citizens against libel and trespass.
In addition to identifying overriding state interests, the Supreme Court
has stated that preemption will be avoided only where there is minimal
risk that state and federal remedies would conflict, and thus minimal interference with the effective administration of the federal labor policy.' 70 In
regulating employers through notice statutes, the state's focus is on the employers' conduct in recruiting replacements. In contrast, the NLRB asserts
jurisdiction only after the replacements have been assimilated into the employer's workforce. 17 1 The NLRB has no authority to regulate the employer's relationship among persons not considered "employees" under the
states that Congress has sanctioned state laws which apply to the general public without
regard to whether they are employers, employees, or labor organizations. 62 I11. 2d at 555,
344 N.E.2d at 4 (quoting Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337,
1355-56 (1972)).
167. See text acompanying notes 147-51 supra. In Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430
U.S. 290, the Court stated that it was not "the history of the tort at issue, but rather.., the
state's interest in protecting the health and well being of its citizens." Id at 303.
168. Cf. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (commercial advertising by optometrists). If truthful advertising is nonetheless misleading, a state faces no obstacle in alleviating this deception. Id at 16. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976) (first amendment does not prohibit states
from "insuring that the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as freely").
Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 150 (1963) (states have traditional powers to protect their citizens from deceptive advertising of food products).
169. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. at 763 (consumers have a strong interest in free flow of information).
170. See text accompanying note 145-46 supra. While we have already determined that
notice statutes frustrate federal labor policy, the key inquiry here is whether, when state and
federal governments provide remedies, the risk of interference is at a minimum.
171. See, e.g., Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1962) (replacements
treated as permanent employees for purposes of voting in representational elections); NLRB
v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963) (superseniority granted to replacement
workers violated section 8(a)(3) of the LMRA).
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Act.' 72 There is some risk that threat of prosecution under a strikebreaking notice statute may inhibit some employers or third parties from recruiting replacements. Absent a vague or ambiguous statute, however, it is
doubtful that an employer would forgo hiring replacements due to a fear
of issuing a notice. Thus, the slight risk is acceptable in light of the sub173
stantial state interest involved.
In summary, if the Supreme Court has exhausted the list of interests
"deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility," then a state's concern
for truthful advertising will not exempt notice statutes from preemptive
displacement. However, the importance of full and accurate information
by which workers can make informed decisions militates against such a
stringent application. Courts need only extend the interpretation of interests deeply rooted in local concern slightly to encompass strikebreaking
notice statutes. Lastly, these statutes pose little risk of interference with the
effective administration of the federal labor policy.
III.

CONCLUSION

State strikebreaking laws must be subjected to a federal preemption
analysis. They focus on the very heart of the collective bargaining process
by regulating an employer's economic self-help weapons. The hiring of
replacements during a strike is considered a legitimate means for an employer to operate his business and combat union economic pressures.
Prohibiting employers and third parties from recruiting and hiring replacements upsets the balance between the employer and the union, and therefore frustrates national labor policy. Statutes which so prohibit employers
and third parties will not withstand judicial scrutiny and will fall under the
preemption doctrine.
In contrast, strikebreaker notice statutes, although frustrating the effective administration of federal labor policy by upsetting the economic balance between labor and management, serve a compelling local interest in
accurately and fully informing the public. These statutes are properly excepted from the preemption doctrine as laws regulating "interests deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility."
Frank Martorana

172. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), which defines "employees" under the Act.
173. See Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. at 303-04 (state interest in protecting
its citizens from infliction of emotional distress outweighed the slight risk of the state touching on a claim of discrimination in hiring hall referrals, an unfair labor practice under the

act).

